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Empire's Law: Foreign Relations

by Presidential Fiat
RUTI G. TEITEL

This essay considers the question of whether September 11 had an impact on the relationship of law and politics. It begins with the question of
methodology. While recognition of historical continuities is important,
my essay primarily focuses, instead, on new developm ents in the particular relationship of law and politics. The essay contends, first, that
an analysis of the law post-September 11 can illuminate the politics involved and, moreover, that such an analysis suggests that we are indeed
in a constructed transformative moment-that analysis of the legal responses to 9/11 reveals the concerted attempt to shift the site of political
sovereignty at present and, in particular, to the U.S. executive.

Th e Problem of Method
Consider to begin with the methodological question regarding the extent to which September 11 is a transformative moment in the relationship oflaw and politics.' What this essay explores here is the relationship
between the legal responses of the Bush administration and the events
themselves in order to better understand how the sense of the transformative significance of these political events is constructed by the law.
The prevailing approach to the relationship of law and politics tends
to miss the particular significance of the role of law because, in regard to
the current administration, there is a tendency to adopt a highly "realist"
approach to law and politics, one that is almost nihilistic as to the expectations of the law.2 The realists tend to conflate the question of the rule of
law with the political. In the realist approach, the legal response to September 11 is largely a product of the politics of September 11, which in

turn is thought to relate to the prevailing power balance of the various
relevant political actors, such as the administration, the Congress, and
the p eople, as well as the international community.
While it explains a lot, a problem with the reali st approach is that it
does not provid e an adequate acco unt for the role of law. An alternative
approach to understanding Septem ber 11 emerges in tho vivid deba te be tween the realists and the idealists. From the idealist perspec tiv e on the
post-September 11 political situation, there arc a number of principles
of law and normative valu es that shou ld have been adh ered to during
this period, in particular relating to civil liber ties and to the tradeoffs
posed between the interests of the state and the rights of individuals and
groups. 3 The antinomy posed hero relates to varying conception s of the
relation oflaw and politics: idealists tend to consider law to be largely independent of political factors , while realist (and c ritical) legal theorizing
tends to emphasize law's close relationship to politics.
This essay attemp ts to navigate th e shoals of Scylla and Charybd is, to
negotiate the constraints of the realist and idealist approaches, and to discuss the relationship of law and politics during this period via an alternative interpretive approach , which I contend offers a better account of
what happened. One might characterize t his interpretation as refl ec ting a
pragmatic approach to the relationship of law and politics. That approach
is aimed at trying to clmify to what ex tent we are in a transformative mom ent and precisely how one might und ers tand the co nstructive impact
of the Bush administration's responses.
The historical perspective that Marilyn Young adopts in her essay in
this volume helpfully illuminates for us the continuiti es in the adminis tration's approach. Young contends that the current responses in the
war against terrorism involve a geopolitical balance of power historically
reminiscent of the high Cold War p eriod, namely, the period immediately following the Second World War, when the United States clea rly
emerged as the world's sole global power for a time. Young then goes on
to suggest a way in which the current behavior of the United States is
continuous with its his torical political role and to point to other ways in
which current U.S. unilateralism appears to go even farther than that of
the high Cold War period. Beyond the Cold War analogy in Young's essay
lies another analogy to a broader war model. One question this raises is
whether the right analogy here is to the Cold War, to a hotter war, or to
something other than war.
In my own view, understanding the current administration's actions
may necessitate thinking in terms of other paradigms. The mgument here
is that we should turn away from the excep tional character of a war and
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turn instead to the juridical-political regime associated with absolule
sovereignty and sec urity, tentatively termed here "empire's law.'"'

Narrating September 11: Transitional Narra/Jves of War and Ju stice
Shortly after September 11, a debate began about the political and social construction of the ..even ts being played out in tho m edi a and in Lhe
Bush administra tion. The first narrative after the even ls begins with the
story of the World Trade Center towers' coJl apse, and thousands ki lled,
as a deplorable tragedy. This tragic narra tive lasts a very short time, for
s uch a narrative elicits no necessary response , but fatali sm. This is un American; there has to be so mething to do. Almost imm ediately thereafter, the tragic narrative gives way to a "j ustice" narrative. When the
World Tracie towers' collapse is characterized as an "a ttack,"" il refra mes
the administration's response. In "Operation Infinite Justice," the administratio n begins to characterize the events as a failure of criminal law; and
the ca ll is issued to bring Osama bin Laden to "justice." Almost from the
start , the term "O pera tion Infinite Ju stice" was criticized for il-s absolutist, jihad-so unding language, yet it was perhaps an hones t reflect ion of
the administration's position and policy direction. To respond to ex tremist fundamentali sm, there must be universals. And there would later be
a similar rhe toric of morality aligned with the adm inistration's political
respo nse.
Therea fter, there co mmenced an evident debate within th e ad ministration regarding what the proper response to the Se ptember 11 eve nts
should be. While there was an ap peal to launching the "war agains t terrorism," there was also language alluding to alternative , competing juridicalpolitical models. The reference to "campaigns" sugges ts that what is at
stake is not a conventional war but, rather, an ongoing police operation:
"Opera tion Infinite Justice."
Wh at then took center stage was a growing debate over which modelwar or justice- wa s most apropos for exp laining September 11 and its
aftermath . In this regard, there were vaTious camps, with the defense
es tablishment supporting the militaTy mod el, while the legal establishment, some members of Congress , and civ il libertarians, in particular,
were insisting that the events of September 11 posed a problem of justice
and that its perpetrators ought to be treated like those implicated in th e
1993 attemp ts on the World Trade Center, namely, along th e lines of ordinfil·y federal judicial processes." No coherent explana tion was offered for
why the events of 2002 sho uld not be handled like those in 1993.
While Lhere has been discussion of divers e wfil·-versus-justice re196

Ruti G. Teitel

spon ses to Se ptember 11 , a t th e s tart these res ponses were not always so
easily di s lingui sha ble in the rea lm of intern al.i on al affa irs, as there has
his torically been a close nex us in the discourses of war and jus ti ce. Indeed, hi storica lly, there h as been an es tablish ed role for intern a tional
criminal trials in th e jus lification of war, mea nt to ra ti onalize and s upport
lhe aim s of mililary intervention in th e n ame ofhum a nity.7
Yet it h ardl y m a ttered whi ch sid e of th e deba te on e followed: wh eth er
ii: was the war model th a t would !:rea l the Taliban regime and its allies as
th e ene my, guid ed by the relevant Jaw of war, or the jus ti ce mod el that
would trea t members of Al Qa eda and those who harbored tJrnm as criminals subj ec t lo dom es tic Jaw. The more profound probl em h ere was tha t
the adminis tration saw no reason to commit to either of th ese condition s,
seeking to foll ow neither the iaw of war, including the agreem ents binding on th e Uniled Sta tes in pe riod s of co nJlict," nor, ordina1·ily, applicable
dom es tic crimin al or co nstitutional law. 9 Ins tead , it see med to be delib erately seeking out gray areas of nonlaw, or "no-Jaw."
The positi on tha t emerged is t·hat th e military appeared not to be ac counta ble to th e ordinary dom es ti c legal regim e, but neith er was it subject lo a gen eral application of an international humanitarian reg im e.
Wh ereas in ordin ary times th e mililary would have bee n fully s ubj ect to
a juridical regim e, what became apparent was the attempt to use Septe mber 11 as an occasion for an ex tend ed "emergency" and a state of exce ption regarding th e law. Mo re and more, the adminis tration call ed for
law th a t was "exce ptional." The claim was that beca use th e United States
was in an exceptional position, wh a teve r rela ted law was exception al,
and de termining ins tan ces of depa1ture, or exception, from law would
be fully up to the adrninisb·ation.w
To what ex tent is thi s adminisl'ration's position n ew, a11d to what extent is it rel a ted to September 11? Ju st how mu ch continuity is there in lhe
adminis tra tion's approach ? Even before September 11 , th ere had alrea dy
bee n a subs tantial coll aps e of the Jaw of war and lh e law of peace and a
move toward significant overlap of th ese in the d iscow-se oflm man rights
and oth er foreign a ffairs. Th e politi cal conditions of th e heighten ed political transitions at the close of the twenti eth century, along with spiraling political fragmenta tion , have led to fail ed or weak s ta tes, stea dy-state
small wars, and the apparent toleration of ongoing conflict. J have characterized this as the "normali za tion" of tra11 sition al political conditions,
which are associated with th e apparent entrenchm ent of an ongoing Jaw
of confli c ts. A central concern of th e intern a tional rul e of law at p rese nt
has becom e how to manage ongoing situa tion s of conflict in global politics.n
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sovereign. Instead, today "security sovereignty" is shared, and it depends
on bodies of principles th at are widely applicable and e nforceable, rendering the U.S. position favoring "nonlaw," or law of the exception, as out
of step with the emerging consensus. This is elaborated below.

Th e Law of the Exception
Consider some illuslrations of the use of law in th e sovereign sec urity
state model. Relatedly, consider the relationship of th e expansion of the
security state to the growth in the exec utive, and the res ulting risks, of an
imperial presidency. I shall disc uss three issues: f-irsl, the expansion of
exec utive di scre tion that is charac teristic of the police power and, in particular, the exec utive discretion in the administration's "militmy order"
authorizing detentions in the war against terrori sm; next, th e proposed
military tribunals a11Cl how and to what extent these illustrate the "police
power" model; and, last, the U.S. position in the international comm unity and, in particular, regarding the new International Criminal Court:,
the institution es tablished to prosec ute the most heinous offenses under
international hum anitarian law. The crea tion of the 1cc has coincided
with the post-September 11 respo nses and, therefore, offers a further
illusb.-a tion of the sovereign security state mod el.

Framing th e lawless em e1gency: th e November 13th order. Here, I address the "military" order authorizing the detention, trea tment, and b·ial
of certain noncitizens in the war against terrorism. Two months after
September 11, on November 13, 2001, the Bush administration tried to
impose regulations concerning th e sec urity situation at the tim e, and
its characterization of the events reflects the invoca tion of the sec urity
state model. 20 It eventually became clear that the administration was not
exac tly looking for a legal analogy; just the reverse- it appeared to be
looking for a way out of any applica ble law. What became evid ent during
this period, through the order's definition of the applicable admini sb·ative regime, was the creation of a state of excep tion: leading the order's
findings are that the post-September 11 situation is a "national emergency." Moreover, the November 13 order asserts that it is "not practica ble
to apply in the proposed military commissions under order" "the principles of law and the rules of evidence genera lly recognized in the trials
of criminal cases in the U.S . Distri ct Courts." 21 Indeed , thi s fram es the
sta te of exception regarding the applicable law. Present political realities
me characterized as posing an "extraordinary emergency," and the re-
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lated exce ptions are just ified by "an urgent an d compelling govcrn mcnl
interes t."" "Comp elling" in teres l·s are those of a cons titutional order.
The political conditions being conside red are excep tiona l and arc defined in terms of security. This language already constitutes a move away
from law, for th e rationale of sec urity is being used to jus tify !he suspe nsion of law, that is, law 's op era tion in a stale of excepti on . Th e dcfinil ion
in "security" term s is a regime definition of condition s tha t rela te to th e
police role. The n ext p oint goes to th e problem of defining ju st who is
s ubj ec t to the order. Wha t is remarkabl e in lighl of the above s latemenl
of the "emergen cy" is th e absen ce of a de l'inilion of the rele vanl subj ec t
of the order, whether of the substantive offenses or of th e sla I us of the
individual subj ec ts. According to lhe order, a person can be tried for v io la tions of the "laws of war and oth er applicable laws" z:1 with res pec l· Lo
"acts of inlernational terrorism." 2 '1 Yet 1110 November 13 order lac ks a definition of terrori sm . Beca use of tha t, in addition lo va rious del'i.nit:ions, in cluding m embership in Al Qaeda , the individuals s ubj ect to the military
order and eligible for de tention include "non -US. citizens," with respec l
to whom the presiden cy "determine[s] from tim e to tim e"'" tha t, if they
do not fit one of the other definition s, "it is in the inte res t of th e U.S . that
suc h individuaHs] be subj ect to this order." 2G Wh at thi s essentially means
is that the definition of individu als s ubj ec t to Lhe de te ntion orde r will be
left entirely to the president.
The problem with the la ck of definition in the November 13 ord er is Iha l
it shows the extent to which, despite th e use of the term "military order "
and the reference to "military commissions," this promulgation is hardly
an exercise n ecessarily within the law of w ar. It is n ot clear whe ther m ere
m embership in Al Qa eda , h arboring terrorists, and oth er offenses left undefin ed in the order viola te th e law of war, which is, after all , the necessar y predicate for the jurisdiction of the military commission , under both
the common law and Article 21 of the Uniform Cod e of Militar y Justice.27
Not all acts of international terrorism are n ecessarily violations of !he law
ofwai-. Therefore, for the order to be applica ble to the intended ca tegories
of acts and p ersons, added sp ecific authority from Congress would be
n ecessary. What is plain about the administration's November 13 ord er is
the extent to which it is an iJlu s tration of apparenlly unbridl ed executive
discretion.
Another problem of exp and ed exec utive prerogatives tha t thrna tens
the separa tion of powers is th e order's attempt to ex tend the jurisdiction
of the proposed military commissions to acts n ot associa ted with September 11. This uncouples the a uthority of the proposed military com mis-
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sions from Congress's September 18 joint resolution, whi ch sanctioned
force against those who planned , authorized, committed , or aided tho terrorist attacks on September 11. 2u There is a remarkable gap between the
predicate bases of the Bush ord er and the definition of the substantive
offenses in the authority granted by the congressional reso lution. For the
congressional authority granted was rather limited , and it was dehned
in term s of September 11. Congress's resolution was most ce rtainly not
a declaration of war, whereas tho administration's order is far more ambiguous-and a somewhat tautological statement of exec utive fiat. The
November 13 order, which proposes military commissions to address offenses w1related to the September 11 attacks, particul arly against persons
in the United States, in the absence of further congressional ac tion, raises
serious ques tions of both constitutional and statutory authoril y. What is
patently elem is that the order constitutes an act of pure executive discre tion.
Many months after September 11 , this state of affairs ha s continued.
Indeed, to this clay, the administration has failed to publicly identify the
suspec ts in its sweep. 2u Moreover, beca use of the secrecy and nonl:ransparency of th ese detentions, even if there were definitions of the subjects or offenses in the order, it would be nearly impossible to verify the
definition by the application of the order. Such secret detentions are the
hallmark of the police state. 30
Th ere are other aspects of the military order, particularly in reference
to tho military tribunals, that raise serious problems of abuse of executive discretion. Even though the terms of the Bush order could apply to
prisoners of war, it is not limited to them because it also includ es "unlawful combatants" and others.a, At least two categories of persons are
protec ted under the law of war: "prisoners of war" and "unlawful combatants." However, the Nove mber 13 order also potentially applies to other
ca tegories of persons. Moreover, there is no attempt to reconcile the order
with international law. That the order gives the president exclusive authority to make the determination of whether a person fits the ca tegories
of the order renders the order standardless and sweeping, a perfect illusl:ration of pure executive discretion . It is remarkable to have a standardless order of this kind , without an independent appeal. This is in clear
conllict with prevailing international law. Article 106 of the Third Geneva
Convention requires a right of appeal for prisoners of w ar and provid es
that prisoners of war should be treated in the same manner as "the members of the armed forces of the detaining power." n The extraordin ary unilateral nature of the president's decision pursuant to the order, toge ther
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with the absence of standards, conflicts with the Third Geneva Convention, which specifically provides for a hearing by a competent tribunal
to determine whether a person might fa ll in to the category of either "unlawful combatant" or "prison er of war." Indeed, in the absence of such
hearings , persons in custody are supposed to be given the benefit of the
presumption that they are prisoners of war.33
Moreover, under domes tic law, the milital'y order denies the basic
rem edy of habeas corpus provided by the U. S. Constitution. Denial of
this supreme constitutional right, which is guaranteed except in the extraordinary emergen cy of "cases of rebellion or invasion ," 34 raises seriou s
constitutional questions because the existence of s uch limiting political
conditions would ordinar ily be determined by Congress. 35 Indeed, the
choice of Guantanamo Bay itself points to a deliberate selection of a site
intended to be outside the parameters of the Constitution. 36
Subsequent rules promulgated by the administration for guiding the
proposed military tribunals may mitigate some of the problems with th e
original order.37 Under the March 2 1 , 20 0 2 , rules, a military tribunal's decisions will be reviewed by a three-member panel; however, without an
independent appeals process,:rn many of the original concerns. remain.
Once again, what is und erscored in the post- September 11 expanded
prosec utori al powers is the nearly unfettered executive discretion over
who will be prosecuted and under what rules, as well as what standards
will guide the review of convictions and sentences.

Th e militwy tribunals. Next, I shall discuss asp ects of the military tribunals that further illustrate the deployment of what I have chara cterized
as the "law of exception." The November 13 order concerning the military tribunals proposed that suspec ted Al Qaeda members or supporters would be tried before them but also lumped toge ther all sorts of disparate defendants and related laws. Again, what is suggested is that the
United States is operating largely outside established legal regimes in the
area of "exception." This is indeed a law of exception because the military tribunals follow neither U. S. law nor international law; nor are they
commensurate with either the war model or the justice model. Instead,
they are consistent with a security regime that functions at the limits of
the law.
That the exceptional charnc ter of the military tribunals for terrorism
suspec ts puts them in an "in between" or "no-law " legal zone can be seen
in the mixed character of the offenses to be tried. "Terrorism" and "assis ting terrorism" do not necessarily fall under the law of war. The hybridity
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of the proposed milita ry tribunals is simil arly seen in the judging powers
of both civilian and military judges; and it is also evid ent in the p otential
s ubj ec ts, which includ e both alien civilians and prisoners of war.
The extraordinary p ower arroga ted by the exec utive epitomizes the
sovereign p olice state. The president asserts the power to p uni sh any
non citize n who viola tes a broadly defined und erstanding of th e laws of
war, but it is n evertheless a power tha t is not co nsistent with the laws
of war. Wha t is re markable is the extent to whi ch the presid ent is going
it alone here. Th ere has not been a classic decl a ration of war regarding
the events of Sep tember 11; the limited a uthority that Congress gave Lo
the president was to engage in the "n ecessm·y and appropriate" use of
force. There fore, the so-called milit,u-y tribunals actually have ver y little
connec tion to Septemb er 11 , but rath er a ppear to be an i ll us lration of the
ex ploitation of contemporary political conditions to ex pand exec utive
power in a rem arkable way. Where the standard is "necessary a nd appropria te," then the review standard in the relevant inquiry wou ld go to
whether the ac tions taken are disproportionate, that is, whether secret
de tentions , military tribunals, and the absen ce of appeals are disproportionate to the limited state of em ergen cy ass ociated with Septe mber 11 .
To what extent will there be any judi cial constraints on or any meaningf-i.d
judicial review of the current policies?
The other ch ara cteristic aspec t of the sec w-ity regim e seen here is tha t
the n otion of the "terrorist" has no fixed m eaning and is left always open
to definition (and ex pan sion) by the executive ; moreo ve r, it is increasingly defin ed in terms of the classic "friend/en e my" distinction of p olitics.'1D This is clea rly evident in the November 13 order wh en it refe rs to
"non-citizens," who, by definition , are not full m embers of the decisionmaking community and are being trea ted in ways tha t ought to imply
close judicial scrutiny.
ln the present sec urity regime, law is all about wh a t allows enforcemen t, wha t en abl es the p olice op era tion. There is little oth er independe nt meaning. While this use of police operations in the world did not
begin with September 11 (for example, the "Gulf Was" represents a historical precedent), we can nevertheless expect to see more of this in th e
campaign against terrorism .

Th e United States and the international community. So far, I have bee n
discussing the adminis tration's overt response to terrorism, a probl em
th at transcends the conve ntional discre te lines of domes tic and intern ational politics a nd law. Indee d, it is definit ional of terrorism , given its
aim s and obj ec ts, that it des tabilizes es tabli shed ca tegori es in th e law
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along those lin es . Now, l l urn to the rea lm that is exp li citly in tern a tional.
The int erna tio na l co n Lex i makes c lear th e admin is tra tion 's con cep tion of
sovereignty, particul a rl y, its view of the U.S. p ositi on in the world.
As disc ussed above , in its response to September 11, th e United Sta tes
has largely sought to esch ew the pa rame ters of inl·ern ationa l Jaw. Moreove r, it has e lided the oth er po liti cal cons train ts of allies, making it pla in
tha t ii w ill pursue a un il a teral ac ti on , whelh er wilb respect to de tain ed
terrori s ts, th e a tl'ac k on Afghanista n, or, more currently, in its plan to
ex tend the war on terrori s m to Iraq, des pite the fac t tha t oth er m ultilateral op tions wo uld have been possibl e, as the terror ist atlac ks on the
U.S. civilians clearl y co ns tituted a crim e again s t humanity.''° Never theless, thi s unil a teral s tan ce h as becom e the norm.
Th e final illu s tra tion o l' "e mpire's law " disc uss ed here is the U.S. positi on regarding a p erm ane nt lnl·ern a Lion aJ Crimina l Court.'" Th e deba te
ove r wheth er the United Sta tes wo uld become a par ty to the 1cc bad Jong
been unde r way during th e p os i-Septe mber 11 responses, yet, prior to
Septe mber 11 , th e fina l U.S . p ositi on had n o t been fu!l y reach ed. Had hi story gon e differently, one co uld sp ec ula te tha t the U.S. pos ition on th e
1cc's fa teful d evelopment might also have been differen t.
Des pite so me impe tu s toward Urn cr ea tion of a permanent internati on al criminaJ tribunal after Nu rem berg, the geo political U.S.-Soviet balan ce delaye d its d evelopment until half a century la ter. During Urn spring
of 20 0 2, m ore than six ty co untri es ratified the "Rom e Trea ty," enough to
es tablish a perman ent IC C. Th e jurisdicti on of this co ur t over the most
h einoLts vio la ti ons began during the summer of 2002. 42
The United Sta tes has n ow offi cially "unsigned" th e lrea ty and h as in dicated th at it will resis t U10 co urt's jurisdiction. 4 3 Moreover, the United
States now appears to be on ihe road to full -fl edged op positi on to Lh e 1cc ,
as eviden ced in its diplom acy with other countri es as well as in th e remarkable condilions of exception th at tl1e administrati on has dem and ed
regarding its ro le in so-called p eace op erations aro und the world.""
Con sider the U.S . p os ition during the debate about the 1cc and the exte nt to which it foll ows the s truc ture of tl10 sover eign police argumen t
di sc ussed above . In the 1cc d eba te, the adminis Lra ti on once agai n is operating at the limits of the Jaw, as it follows neitl1 er the regime of ordinary
p eace tim e law nor the regime of military justice.4 " Moreover, in tl10 ICC
debate, th e mi litary is invoked as the basis of th e admini s tration's op position.4GThis is partic ularly problematic as the admini stra tion justifies its
opposition .in terms of sec urity concerns, wh ere it finds itself regularly
juxtaposing mi litary authority to th a t of th e law.
This notion of a military au thority above the law is charac teris tic of
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non-rule-of-law states. Howe ver, the position defended by the United
States , adop ting that of the Departm ent: of Defe nse, is pre mised on a more
co mplex, even parndox ical, police argument: namely, that the claim to
exception from the law is grounded from within the law and its enfo rcemen t. According to this argument, as th e sole military superpower and
fun ctioning as a worldwide cop , the United States has a grea ter potential expo sure to the 1cc's jurisdiction, and , the admini strati on contends,
there is a strong possibility of politicized prosecutions. Therefore, so the
argument goes, the United States needs privileged pr otec tion from the
1cc's juri sdi ction. 4 7
While at first the United States pushed for the strategy of "exception
at will" - with the United States having the power to lobby referral of all
cases by the U N Sec urity Council and block any it opposed with a vetoit became clear that exclusive Security Council refe rral jurisdicti on in
lhe 1cc w ould not be accepted. In the final trea ty, th e Sec urity Co uncil
re tains referral power, as well as the power to temporaril y defer prose cutions that arrive in the court via alternative routes. For some time, the
United States continued to try to find a legal formula for exemption, but,
by the end of the Rome confe rence, it dropped even the pretense of a
formu la, peremptorily demanding, instea d , a full and total exemption
fro m the court's prosecution s. This stan ce rendered impossible further
engagement by the United States in the 1cc. The fin al decision to "unsign"
the prece ding administration's signature to the Rome Treaty, executed in
lhe Clinton presid ency's last days, was merely the fo rmal extension of the
Bush admini stration's stated position that it did not intend to cooperate
with the court. 4 8
In Europe, as well as in U.S. human rights circles, there has been a s ub stantial outcry over the American position. The claim is that the Bush administration is being hypocritical because it insists that other countries
adhere to international law while always seeking a full exemption for the
United States. Much is made of the occasional U.S. support for international institutions , such as the ad hoc criminal tribunal presently trying
former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic 49 and adjudicating atrocities relating to the Rwandan genocide.50 Of course, there are others who
argue just the opposite, noting that the international institutions may be
less politicized than any individual state's judiciary.5 '
Nevertheless , to some extent, the U. S. position regaTding the Hague
war crimes tribunal prosec uting Milosevic and the U. S. position on the
1cc are not irrecon cilable, but, rather, follow the present administra tion's
logic. Since the United States conceives of itself as the world sovereign,
one might argue that it: would be con tra dictory for U. S. poli ce operations
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to be subject to the 1cc. Ind eed, the 1cc s tands for the possibilil y thal a ny
h ead of s tate anywh ere in Lhe world co uld po tenti ally be s ub ject to lhe
court's jurisdiction and thus to a sovereign police ac tion."z Therefore, to
yield to the ice's jurisdiction would , to so me ex tent, contravene th e U.S .
sovereign poli ce logic, that is, where the United Slates is deemed Lhe
preeminent enforcer ye t som ehow liable to being the objec t of a poli ce
action. Indeed , the point of the United States as th e sovereign police
power is now being made in Lhe ad h oc interna tional tribun al prosec ution of Milosevic to justify the enforceme nt of hum anitarian interve ntion
by the N ATO powers. So the very ques ti on posed by Lhe new internat ional
juridical regime is whether there ought to be review of so vereign p olice
power. To what extent might accommodating expanded juridica l so vereignty be interpreted as a challenge Lo the exceptional statu s of th e U.S.
police power worldwid e?

Conclusion
The very definition of sovereignty today means th e power to d efine th e
limits of the law, that is , the power to susp end the validity of exis ling
international and constitutional law. The United States claims with respect to the current international hum anitarian law regime that, as the
self-appointed world police, it must operate in a sta le of exception. Ye t
while this argument may h ave surface plausibility, it is clear that the
United States is not an effective world sovereig n, as it has no monopoly
over legitimate violen ce, which is in any event defin ed more by nu merous conventions enforced in a decentra lized way - in and by th e law, not
in its lurch .
A similar logic is being deploye d at the domestic level. As with terrorism, there is substantial fluidity in the ramifications of the domes tic for
foreign affairs and vice versa. Here, the contradictions are only more evident, clearly revealing a politicized exec utive, attempting to man euver
on the b asis of terrorism , free of congressional oversight or constitutional
ch ecks. At the domestic level, one can see that the administration's rhetoric reflects a fr eewheeling, nontran sparent executive. Ther e is only a
veneer of the sovereignty of law. 53 For the most part:, to date, the administration's various operations have proceeded without congressional or
judicial ch eck, and the challe nge to the rul e of law is even grea ter in th e
domestic context.
We need to be tter unde rstand the contemporary expan sion in the presidential police power in the nam e of emergency. Th ese developments
should be interpreted in the contex t of other broader political changes,
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fo r the mos t pmt related to globalization politics that have threatened
many of the established institutions and processes that h ave hitherto provided accountability and legitimacy. In thinking about political institu tions in hm·d times, we should not allow the ex tension of what ought to
be limited emergencies a-s a pretext for the permmrnnt expansion of the
security s tate. States of exception should be trea ted as such -at best, as
provisional accmrunodations, s ubj ect to constitutional limitations. Whil e
the problem of terrorism may defy facile analogies, whether to war, to
the police state, to ordinary times, it ought not become an occasion for
lawlessness. Ind eed , the las t century saw a history of such abuses in th e
war against communism .
Analysis of the law after September 11 illuminates the U. S. attempt to
cons truct a sovereign role in international affairs. Ye t, in many ways, this
conslruction is paradoxical, and even beside the point, for September 11
makes clear the obsolescence of the prevailing und erstanding of national
security premised on territory and forc e. Rather thm1 lying outside law,
the emerging notion of security will depend on greater international cooperation within the law.
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